Texas v. Cobb

Texas v. Cobb

Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 16, 2001
Decided April 2, 2001
Full case name Texas, Petitioner v. Raymond Levi Cobb
Argument Oral argument
Holding
Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific," it does not extend to offenses that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged.
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
Concurrence Kennedy, joined by Scalia, Thomas
Dissent Breyer, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg

Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001), is an important 2001 Supreme Court criminal procedure decision which held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific and does not always extend to offenses that are closely related to those where the right has been attached. This decision reaffirmed the Court's holding in McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) by concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the onset of adversarial proceedings.

Contents

Overview

In 1994 Raymond Levi Cobb confessed to a home burglary, but denied involvement in the disappearance of a woman and child from the same home. Cobb later retained an attorney to represent him for the burglary charge but didn’t have one for the case involving the woman and child. While Cobb was free on bond in the burglary case, Cobb’s father contacted the police to tell them his son had confessed to killing the woman and child. The police questioned Cobb, who waived his Miranda rights and confessed to both murders. He was subsequently charged with both murders. After his conviction and death sentence, Cobb appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on the grounds that his confession had been obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Cobb argued the confession should have been suppressed because his right to counsel had been invoked once he had been charged in the burglary case. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals said that because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not offense-specific, the police could not have interrogated Cobb and his confession was inadmissible.[1]

Response

Critics of the 5–4 decision predicted that the offense-specific rule would endanger suspects’ rights and grant police too much power to carry out interrogations without the presence of counsel. The majority, in response, pointed to suspects’ abilities to invoke their Miranda rights during interrogations –rights which were waived by Cobb. The majority opinion also introduced the Blockburger test — which is used in determining double jeopardy — into Sixth Amendment jurisprudence when using its dictates to determine the distinctiveness of the crimes at issue in the case. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the majority opinion’s author, saw no reason to make a distinction between the meaning of the term “offense” in the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth.

The Minority

This differed from the more ambiguous “closely related” test the minority felt was appropriate for Sixth Amendment considerations. The minority predicted the Blockburger test would prove difficult to administer for police — as it has proven to be for judges and lawyers — and would undermine other decisions where the “closely related” test was used.

See also

References

Further reading